(2008/5768)
This week’s Parasha begins with “VeEileh HaMishpatim,” “And these are the ordinances;” the laws that the Sanhedrin – the Jewish religious Supreme Court – must enforce. The juxtaposition of this section to the preceding section, which dealt with aspects of the Mizbeiach, is buttressed by the conjunction “and,” and many Meforshim offer explanations of this Semichut. Rashi, quoting Tanchuma, says this connection is why the Sanhedrin was located in the Beit HaMikdash adjacent to the Mizbeiach. Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank notes that this placement represents their mutual characteristic of being a peacemaker, as Korbanot are offered on the Mizbeiach to attain atonement for our sins, making peace between Bnei Yisrael and Hashem, and the Sanhedrin executes justice, making peace between men; therefore, the Torah places the Sanhedrin near the Mizbeiach.
The Aveni Azel views this connection as an example of a fundamental difference between the world’s and Hashem’s civil law. The former has no religious or moral basis, but rather is a social agreement that allows society to function peacefully; however, the Torah’s civil law is part of God’s mandate and is endowed with the same sanctity as other Mitzvot. This equality is seen by that even though the word “Luchot” refers to all Ten Commandments on both tablets, it is written in the singular form “Luchat,” since the first tablet of spiritual laws is equal to the second tablet of social laws. The parity between civil law, represented by the Sanhedrin, and ritual law, represented by the Mizbeiach, is the reason why the two are adjacent. Just as Korbanot in the Beit HaMikdash are holy, the civil laws that the Sanhedrin enforces are holy. The Sanhedrin is the earthly agent for Hashem, whose civil laws it enforces, and hence its members are called “Elohim,” a name of Hashem. Rashi comments that both types of laws were given to Bnei Yisrael on Har Sinai. As most of civil law is logical, one might be tempted to see it as man’s creation; therefore, the Torah explains that just as “irrational” laws, whose reasons are unknown to us, are from Hashem at Sinai, these logical civil laws also are from Hashem at Sinai.
The first Mishnah of Pirkei Avot shows this idea, too. Dealing with ethics and morals, Pirkei Avot might be erroneously perceived as the Jewish complement to the great gentile moralists; thus, the Mishnah begins the Masechet by tracing the Torah from Moshe, who “received the Torah from Sinai,” emphasizing that the moral civil laws are no less holy than their ritual counterparts. Imrei Emet explains that a law that can be deduced from a Kal VaChomer (a fortiori) argument sometimes is stated explicitly in the Torah (see, inter alia, Yoma 43a) specifically to show that these laws emanate from Hashem and not from man’s intellect. These “rational” laws must be observed because Hashem commanded us to observe them, not because we decide that they make sense.
The idea that we follow Hashem’s commandments only due to our belief in Him and not because of other reasons was taken to heart by many Jewish scholars. The Vilna Gaon always recited Havdalah using wine, even though Halacha (Shulchan Aruch O.C. 296:2) permits doing so with Chamar Medinah, or the national drink. However, he made a special exception on Motzaei Pesach, when he made Havdalah specifically with beer. He did so because he wanted to show that he abstained from Chameitz on Pesach because Hashem commanded him to, not because he did not like Chameitz. By drinking beer - a drink of Chameitz - after Pesach, the Gaon showed that he did not eat Chameitz previously only because Hashem commanded him to.
Rav Soloveitchik interpreted the phrase in the Hoshanot that we recite on Sukkot, “Yoshevet UMamtenet Ad Sof HaShabbat,” “We sit and wait until the end of Shabbat,” in light of this idea. A Jew abstains from doing Melachah on Shabbat only because Hashem commanded him to, not because he is too lazy to work; therefore, he sits and waits until Shabbat’s conclusion and immediately thereupon performs Melachah. This idea is a difference between Jews and gentiles in regards to divine justice. Gentiles do not only view divine justice as completely separate from civil justice; they see it as irrational and warped. Judaism has a different outlook on divine justice, as even the rational civil laws originate from Hashem, and we follow them because He commanded us to.
The Apter Rebbe explained another difference between the two justice systems. A non-Jewish judge once approached him and tried to explain the gentile justice system’s supremacy. The judge studies the material before the set date for the trial, when two attorneys argue the case and the judge finally makes a well-reasoned decision, which is subject to appeal. The Jewish system, however, seems primitive, as the two parties present their arguments to a judicial panel, which makes a swift decision. The gentile system gives the most opportunities for both parties to be heard and the judge to make a conviction or vindication; however, the Jewish system does not seem to attain justice, as the parties seemingly do not have the chance to show their case adequately nor is the judge presented with enough time to make a thorough ruling. The Apter Rebbe responded with a Mashal. A wolf was about to eat a sheep, but a lion came and snatched it away. The wolf claimed that the lion was a thief, so the two animals decided to settle their dispute by going to a judge, the fox, who ruled that the sheep should be split evenly between the two constituents. After splitting the sheep in half, the fox realized that the halves were not exactly equal, so he took a bite from one half, but as this bite made the other side smaller, he was forced to take another bite to correct his “miscalculation.” Eventually, nothing remained for the litigants. This, the Apter explained, is the fault inherent in the gentile judicial system: events are unnecessarily lengthened, the lawyers’ bills mount (leaving them the lion’s share), and both litigants leave unhappily. In the Jewish system, Beit Din often strives to make a Pesharah, or compromise, that will benefit both sides.
More than half of the 613 Mitzvot and over seventy percent of the Talmud deal with laws relating to the land of Israel. Actually, the Torah explicitly lists justice as a key to inheriting Israel, as the Torah records, “Tzedek Tzedek Tirdof LeMaan Tichyeh VeYarashta Et HaAretz Asher Hashem Elokecha Notein Lach,” “Follow justice and justice alone, so that you may live and possess the land that Hashem is giving you” (Devarim 16:20). Halacha (see Rashi to Shemot 21:1 s.v. Lifneihem) mandates that under most circumstances, civil disputes be brought to Beit Din, not secular court. Obligation or not, we must realize that divine justice, as enforced by Beit Din, is far superior to any other system.